The Tenth Schedule in depth — grounds for disqualification, the merger exception, and the Speaker's contested role.
Added by the 52nd Amendment (1985), the Tenth Schedule disqualifies a member of a House for defection if they: voluntarily give up membership of their political party; vote or abstain against their party's whip without prior permission (and it isn't condoned within 15 days); or, if independently elected, join a party; or, if a nominated member, join a party after six months.
Originally, the law exempted a "split" where at least one-third of a party's members broke away. The 91st Amendment (2003) removed this split exception entirely, retaining only a merger exception — valid when at least two-thirds of a party's members agree to merge with another party.
The 91st Amendment also capped the size of the Council of Ministers at 15% of the total strength of the popular House (Lok Sabha/Legislative Assembly), specifically to curb defection driven by the lure of ministerial berths.
Disqualification is decided by the Speaker or Chairman of the House. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court held that the Speaker acts as a Tribunal while deciding such matters, and while the Speaker's decision has a degree of finality, it is subject to judicial review on limited grounds — mala fide intent, perversity, or violation of natural justice.
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